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consistent with any number of different modes and levels of taxation. We must 
have systems of welfare (tied to job placement) and national health care, he 
argues; yet government should let prices and the distribution of wealth be deter-
mined by the marketplace. 
Interesting as they are, these views are not clearly rooted in the central theses 
of Coppenger's book. Furthermore, Coppenger's account relies on some impor-
tant assertions-that it is just to kill terrorists pre-emptively (p. 136), and that 
the state must "provide the possibility for wealth" (p. 74)-that are put forward 
without argument. Certainly one can offer theological as well as philosophical 
reasons in support of these assertions, but their truth is by no means self-evident. 
Despite these lapses, A Christian View of Justice may serve to advance the 
discussion of issues of social justice in the Christian community. A student from 
a conservative Christian background struggling to relate religious belief to social 
realities might find it particularly helpful. A more critical reader-{)ne aware of 
the political divisions in the evangelical wing of the churches, aware of the 
challenges of liberation theology and free-market economics-may find instead 
that the more difficult problems of relating Christian faith to political action 
begin where this discussion ends. 
The Cognitivity of Religion: Three Perspectives, by J. Kellenberger. Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985, pp. x + 214. 
WILLIAM J. WAINWRIGHT, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. 
Kellenberger's book examines three approaches to the question of religious 
knowledge. "The "First Perspective" insists upon the subjective dimension of 
faith, and is "inclined to deny that one can understand religious belief without 
believing" (36). The "Second Perspective" maintains that religious attitudes and 
practices presuppose "the cognitive belief that God exists" (36), and thinks that 
little sense can be made of skepticism, loss of faith and conversion unless one 
distinguishes understanding and belief. 
The two perspectives also differ in their attitudes towards reason, evidence 
and knowledge. The first is "highly suspicious of rationality in religion" (6). It 
is reluctant to give evidence a place, and suspects that faith and knowledge are 
incompatible. The second values reason, thinks evidence is important, and 
believes that faith and knowledge are compatible. 
Both perspectives are dominated by the model of "enquiry-rationality." One's 
beliefs are rational when one has evidence for them, and adopts them after 
investigating to see what evidence there is. "What is at issue is correct reasoning 
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or the thoroughness of investigation" (129). The evidence is public-"discernible 
to all disinterested investigators" (111), "clear to all when presented" (129), 
something "which upon presentation . . . will be appreciated as a reason" by 
everyone (165). The Second Perspective believes that at least some religious 
beliefs can be rational in this sense. The First Perspective denies it, and concludes 
that religion is arational or has its own logic. 
Kellenberger believes that a 'Third Perspective" can be found in the Psalms 
and "various devotional works" (91). While he is reluctant to "draw the conclusion 
that the Third Perspective is the true, or even best, perspective that applies to 
religious belief' (183), he clearly thinks that it "can accommodate the strengths 
of the other two" (184), and avoid their weaknesses. 
"Realization discoveries" provide an alternative model of rationality. They 
aren't peculiar to religious contexts. For example, suppose a chance remark 
causes someone to recognize motives which he had previously not acknowledged 
and perhaps even denied. His discovery isn't a consequence of investigation 
(gathering, weighing, and ordering evidence). The evidence was already there. 
It was "familiar to him" (l06), and it supported the conclusion. He simply didn't 
see its force. He can't be accused of "investigative failure" (a failure to look for 
appropriate evidence, or to take relevant evidence into account). Nevertheless 
his "insensitivity or blindness" was a cognitive fault and his realization discovery 
is a cognitive achievement. The facts whose significance he now discerns are 
(conclusive) evidence for his belief. Hence his belief is rational even though it 
isn't "enquiry-rational." 
Religious discoveries have the same logical structure. The Psalmist doesn't 
investigate the evidence and then infer God's existence. He "merely beholds the 
hills, the heavens, and the deep and finds there the presence of the Lord" (109). 
His belief is rational, and is based upon evidence, but the sort of rationality it 
exemplifies is "realization-rationality." 
Why do some of us fail to appreciate the force of familiar evidence? 
"Often ... the root cause of blindness ... in realization-contexts is self-decep-
tion" (118). One resists the conclusion and therefore denies what one in a sense 
sees. Even when one doesn't resist the conclusion, one may "will not to under-
stand" (for example, by insisting on public evidence where it isn't appropriate). 
In either case the source of blindness is the will. This can be true in the religious 
case. The Third Perspective attributes religious blindness to "attachment to self, 
or lack of self-denial"-an unwillingness to die "to self outside a relationship 
to God" (115). 
Kellenberger is aware that alleged realization discoveries aren't necessarily 
valid. We can fail to see the significance of familiar facts but we can also read 
a significance into them which they don't have. The devout may discern God's 
presence in familiar facts but it is at least possible that they "read into the 
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universe ... what would fulfil their wish for protection" and their "need for 
security" (120). The crucial cognitive question is thus "Who is blind to the 
familiar and who has seen aright?" (118). 
How can this issue be settled? Self-deception is motivated by "desire to gain 
satisfaction" or "avoid stress" (123). The discovery of a motive of this sort is a 
"strong piece of evidence that a person is deceiving himself." On the other hand, 
"if such a motive" is lacking, "that is conclusive evidence ... that self-deception 
is not present" (124). Kellenberger thinks that the saints aren't motivated by a 
wish for protection or a need for security but admits that their disavowal of these 
interests could be explained by a blindness to their own true motives. He thus 
concludes that "there is ... an enquiry-issue about whether the religious dis-
covery has been made" but it "is uniquely unsettle able" (130). 
Three features of KelIenberger's argument seem problematic-the sharp dis-
tinction between "enquiry-rationality" and "realization-rationality," his account 
of enquiry-rationality, and the claim that discovery involves seeing something 
as evidence. 
1. "Neither the adequacy of argumentation nor the care exercised in weighing 
considerations, nor the thoroughness of evidence gathering is relevant to the 
rationality of the Third-Perspective" (135). The only relevant enquiry issue is 
that of self-deception and this is "uniquely unsettleable." There are two objections 
to this. 
Second Perspective rationality is needed to defeat objections to religious belief. 
Self-deception isn't the only issue in assessing disclosures. We would also dis-
count an alleged discovery if we had good public reasons for thinking its object 
was unreal. The atheologian's objections to religious belief can't be discounted 
without conducting an enquiry investigation of their merits. 
In the second place, Kellenberger hasn't shown that the issue of self-deception 
is unsettleable. His argument seems to be this. (1) A person can't dispel his own 
blindness by investigation. (His problem isn't lack of evidence since the evidence 
is already familiar to him.) (2) When one's blindness is rooted in self-deception, 
there is no real distinction between freeing oneself from self-deception and 
dispelling one's blindness. Hence, (3) one can't free oneselffrom self-deception 
by enquiry. (4) The religious discovery is about "the significance of our very 
lives." Consequently, (5) there are no "neutral observers" who could "disinteres-
tedly investigate" the question of self-deception (128). 
I don't find this convincing. Having a stake in the outcome of an investigation 
isn't the same as self-deception. The latter may be incompatible with enquiry-
rationality. The former isn't. I can fairly investigate many issues which affect 
me deeply. Having a stake in the outcome may imply that I am a potential victim 
of self-deception. It doesn't imply that I am one. Hence, it doesn't imply that 
I can't successfully employ enquiry-rationality. 
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Furthermore, even if I am a victim of self-deception, it isn't obvious that I 
can't dispel it by enquiry-reviewing my conduct, for example, clarifying my 
notions of self-deception, alerting myself to the vagaries of human behavior, 
comparing my own conduct with that of others, etc.-in short, by reasoning. 
Kellenberger thinks I can't do this since a person can't dispel his own blindness 
by investigation. But one can simply tum this on its head and argue that, because 
people can (with difficulty) free themselves from self-deception by enquiry, they 
can dispel their blindness by enquiry. 
2. Kellenberger's enquiry model includes several features: (1) certain attitudes 
towards the evidence (disinterestedness, open neutrality, tentativeness, etc.), (2) 
the assumption that cognitive issues can be fully resolved by enquiry, and (3) 
an insistence that evidence be public in the sense that it can be appreciated as 
evidence by everyone. 
If the enquiry model is designed to capture the views of most natural theolo-
gians, only the third feature seems essential to it. Kellenberger speaks of enquiry-
rationality'S "required attitude of tentativeness and investigative neutrality" (163, 
my italics). But one can prize enquiry evidence (proofs, arguments, etc.), have 
enquiry evidence for one's beliefs, and partly believe for those reasons, without 
adopting enquiry attitudes. (For one thing, one's belief may also have other 
bases-faith, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, or a "religious discovery. ") 
Whether the second feature is essential to enquiry-rationality depends on what 
one includes under "enquiry." Kellenberger's assessment of New.man is revealing. 
The latter's emphasis "on 'concrete' inference and the 'illative sense', is enquiry-
oriented and thus radically different from the realization-epistemology of the 
religious discovery" (178, my italics). Realization knowledge isn't "a matter of 
reasoning" but of "our own individual religious experience" (179). 
But as Newman saw, enquiry-rationality itself (at least as employed in theology, 
the humanities and everyday life) involves more than "reasoning" and analysis. 
At a certain point what is crucial is not further investigation but one's general 
sense of the force of the evidence as a whole. If the "illative sense" is part of 
enquiry-rationality, enquiry-rationality and realization-rationality aren't as dis-
similar as Kellenberger suggests. Enquiry-rationality too incorporates a distinc-
tion between having the evidence before one and grasping its force, and a 
commitment to it is compatible with the belief that the will plays a significant 
role in assenting to a conclusion or resisting it. 
3. At this point, the peculiarity of "realization-rationality" begins to emerge. 
Kellen berger sometimes speaks of recognizing the force or significance of familiar 
evidence and sometimes of recognizing that it is evidence. In the course of his 
discussion it becomes clear that these differ and that discovery includes both. 
Kellenberger thinks that any familiar fact can be realization evidence. "The 
religious discovery turns on one's seeing the religious significance of the familiar 
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facts and surroundings of the world, whatever they may be" (165, my italics). 
'The presence of God ... is to be seen ... not only in the glories of nature 
and the happy events of life, but in the horrible and horrendous events of life 
as well" (169). Kellenberger's position appears to be this. (l) Realization evidence 
is anything which can appropriately be seen as manifesting God. (2) If God 
exists, any familiar fact can appropriately be seen in this way. Hence, (3) 
everything is realization evidence. But, clearly, horrendous events such as the 
Mexico City disaster wouldn't be appreciated as (positive) evidence by everyone. 
Hence, discovery can involve seeing things as evidence which wouldn't be 
regarded as evidence by most people. 
I think Kellenberger is abusing the term "evidence." Christian theists believe 
that everything is grounded in God and can thus be seen as manifesting His 
presence. It doesn't follow that everything is evidence for His presence. As 
Kellenberger recognizes, nothing should be called evidence which can only be 
seen as "evidence" by someone who approaches it with a belief in God. (We 
could call this the "independence principle.") If so, it is doubtful whether cancer 
or the earthquake in Mexico City are evidence of God's presence. Kellenberger 
seems to think that they are, and that the independence principle isn't violated 
because religious belief can "follow the opening of one's religious eyes" (167). 
One needn't approach the earthquake with a prior belief in God in order to see 
it as manifesting God's presence. This may be true. However, what is crucial 
is logical priority not temporal priority. One surely can't regard the disaster as 
"evidence" of God's presence unless one believes that He is present. Either 
coming to see the disaster as "evidence" is the same as coming to believe in His 
presence, or it depends on it. In either case, seeing it as "evidence" logically 
presupposes a belief in God. The spirit of the independence principle is violated 
if not the letter. In short, realization "evidence" isn't evidence. 
I am suggesting that public evidence is the only kind of evidence. Nothing is 
evidence unless competent enquirers agree that it bears on the truth of the 
conclusion although they may disagree about the force of the evidence and the 
conclusion itself. One may experience God's presence in suffering and disaster, 
and one's experience of God may be an adequate reason for believing in His 
presence, but the facts through which one experiences Him in these cases aren't 
themselves reasons. 
I recommend Kellenberger's book. It contains good discussions of Kierkegaard, 
D. Z. Phillips and others. The distinction between the existence of good evidence 
and a recognition of its significance is well drawn and important. Kellenberger 
rightly insists on the role the will plays in appreciating evidence. I think, however, 
that enquiry-rationality can accommodate these insights. I also think that in those 
cases in which "realization-rationality" differs from enquiry-rationality (as under-
stood by people like Newman) it is simply an appeal to religious experience. It 
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isn't a different kind of rationality. 
The Nature and Limits of Authority, by Richard T. De George. Lawrence, 
University Press of Kansas, 1985, pp. 305, VIII, Paper, $12.95. 
LINWOOD URBAN, Swarthmore College. 
Authority has so often been abused that many long for a utopia in which there 
will be no need for authorities of any kind. Richard De George finds such visions 
attractive but does not succumb to their allures since he believes that some 
reliance on authority is the normal state for human beings. Our task is not to do 
away with authority, but to understand its forms. "A reasoned examination of 
the many kinds, uses, justifications, and limitations of authority will help us to 
revise what should be changed and to preserve what should be kept in the 
continuing public and private scrutiny of authority in our society" (10). 
The analysis can be roughly described as Aristotelian. Like Aristotle, De 
George not only provides a description and conceptual clarification of the way 
authority functions in our society, but also justifies authority by its ability to 
enhance the achievement of legitimate human goals. "The key to an appropriate 
defense against totalitarianism is not to argue against all authority but to distin-
guish the kinds and forms of authority and to allow only those that are appropriate 
for the activity involved. My defense of authority is minimalist ... in the sense 
of justifying authority only to the extent required in order to achieve the ends 
one wishes to attain" (285). 
De George initially describes an authority as a person or entity superior in 
some way to another. Within this broad characterization, he distinguishes between 
executive and non-executive authority. Executive authority carries with it the 
right to act on or for another, like a broker representing a client in the market, 
or the right to command, like an officer in the armed forces. Executive authority 
includes the legislative and judicial branches of the government as well as the 
executive branch, since both legislatures and judges have the authority to act 
and also to command. For similar reasons, parental authority is seen as a subclas-
sification of executive authority. 
Non-executive authority is distinguished from executive authority precisely in 
that it does not confer the right to command, or to act on or for another. Primary 
examples of it are the authority conferred by knowledge or competence. These 
two types of authority can be manifested by either teaching or example. De 
George argues that no person has a right to executive authority solely on the 
ground that he or she is an epistemic authority. Individuals may be chosen for 
